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NOTES
make its determination only by carefully weighing the significance of
the burden placed on interstate commerce against the benefit such
legislation provides for the State.
WILLIAM L. THORPE
Environmental Law—Water Pollution Remedies—Application of
Federal Common Law of Public Nuisance to Intrastate Stream
Pollution—Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage
System v. Train.' The Committee. for the Consideration of the Jones
Falls Sewage System, together with private individuals and several
neighborhood associations, brought suit in federal district court
against the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
various individuals and state, municipal, and county agencies 2 to halt
the discharge of sewage into the Jones Falls Stream 3 from the local
sewage system treatment plant. 4
 The plaintiffs alleged that substantial
amounts of untreated raw sewage were flowing into the stream as a
result of the insufficient capacity of the treatment plant, causing un-
acceptable levels of coliform and fecal bacteria in the streams The
suit was intially brought under the citizen suit provision of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 6 which permits
citizens to sue any person who has violated the effluent standards
established under the Act.' The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief
I 539 F.2(1 1006 (4th Cir, 1976) (ca boar).
2 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1149 (D. Md. 1974). The following defendants were named
in addition to Russell Train, the Administrator of the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency; F. Pierce Linaweaver, individually and as Director of' the Baltimore City
Department of Public Works; Mayor and Gity Council of Baltimore City; C. Elmer
Hoppert, Jr., individually and as Buildings Engineer for Baltimore County; and County
Executive and County Council of Baltimore County. Id. The court later permitted Carl
NI. Freeman, Trustee, Carl M. Freeman Associates, Inc., and Ralph DeChiaro Enter-
prises, Inc. to intervene as defendants. 387 F. Supp. 526, 527 (D. Md. 1975).
375 F. Supp. at 1149. From its origin in Baltimore County the Jones Falls
Stream flows through parts of the City of Baltimore, into the Patapsco River, and uld-
mately into Chesapeake Bay via the Baltimore Harbor. Id.
375 F. Supp. at 1149.
Plaintiffs alleged that in 1973 the plant'scapacity was exceeded by three million
gallons of sewage per day. 539 F.2d at 1010 (Butzner, J., dissenting).
5 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 fq. seq. (Supp. V 1975).
7 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Supp. V 1975), the citizen suit. provision, confers jurisdiction
on the district courts. Section 1365(a) provides:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction.
Except as provided in subsection (h) of this section, any citizen may
commence a civil actions on his own behalf—
(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii)
any other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent
permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State with respect to such a standard or limitation, or
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against alleged violations of effluent standards8
 caused by the dis-
charge of sewage by defendant City of Baltimore Department of Pub-
lic Works.8 The district court dismissed the claims for injunctive re-
lief," finding that the defendants were immune from suit for viola-
tion of an effluent standard under section 1342(k) of the Act," by vir-
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this chapter
which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
The districts courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount
in controversy or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent
standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Administrator to
perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any appropri-
ate civil penalties under section 1319(d) of' this title.
8 Section 1365(f) of the Act defines "effluent standard" for the purposes of citi-
zen suits as follows:
(f) Effluent standard or limitaiton.
For purposes of this section, the term "effluent standard or limita-
tion under this chapter" means (I) effective July 1, 1973, an unlawful act
under subsection (a) of section 1311 of this title; (2) an effluent limitation
or other limitation under section 1311 or 1312 of this title; (3) standard of
performance under section 1316 of this title; (4) prohibition, effluent
standard or pretreatment standards under section 1317 of this title; (5)
certification under section 1341 of this title; or (6) a permit or condition
them eof issued under section 1342 of' this title, which is in effect under this
chapter (including a requirement applicable by reason of section 1323 of
this title).
33 U.S.C. 1365(1) (Supp. V 1975).
See 375 F. Stipp. 1148, 1149 (D, Md. 1974). A claim for such relief is permitted
under § 1365(a)(1). See note 7 supra for text of that provision.
Plaintiffs also claimed that the Administrator of the EPA had failed to perform
allegedly non-discretionary duties required by §§ 1253(a), 1255(d), 1318(a), 1319, and
1364 of Title 33, 387 F. Supp. 526, 528 (D. Md. 1975). A citizen suit against the Ad-
ministrator is permitted by § 1365(a)(2) of Title 33. See note 7 supra. In a subsequent
hearing on a motion to dismiss this claim, the district court upheld the claim insofar as
it sought to compel the Administrator to perform duties under $§ 1242(a), 1255(d) and
1318(a), but dismissed that part of the complaint seeking to compel the Administrator's
performance under §§ 1319 and 1364. Id. at 530-31. These claims were not adjudicated
in the court of appeals decision, which addressed only the question whether plaintiffs
might allege a cause of action under the federal common law of nuisance.
'° 375 F. Stipp. 1148, 1153 (D. Md. 1974).
" 33 U.S.C. § 1342(k) (Supp. V 1975). Section 1342(k) essentially provides that a
discharge shall not be a violation of the Act if an application for a discharge permit has
been made, but not yet acted upon.
§I342(k) Compliance with permits.
Compliance with a permit issued pursuant to this section shall be
deemed compliance, for purposes of sections 1319 and 1365 of this title,
with section 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, and 1343 of this title, except any
standard imposed under section 1317 of this title for a toxic pollutant in-
jurious to human health, Until December 31, 1974, in any case where a
permit for discharge has been applied for pursuant to this section, but
final administrative disposition of such application has not been made,
such discharge shall not be a violation of (1) section 1311, 1316, or 1342 of
this title, or (2) section 407 of this title, unless the Administrator or other
plaintiff proves that final administrative disposition of such application has
not been made because of the failure of the applicant to furnish informa-
tion reasonably required or requested in order to process the application.
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tue of their application, prior to the commencement of the suit, for a
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System permit.' 2
As a result of the district court's dismissal of the action for failure
to state a claim for injunctive relief under the federal statute, the
plaintiffs were deprived of a basis for federal court jurisdiction. To
remedy this situation they sought to amend their complaint to state a
cause of action under the federal common law of public nuisance,' 3
thereby presenting the district court with a federal question upon
which the court could base its continued jurisdiction over the suit."
The district court rejected plaintiffs' claim, however, holding that it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there existed no nuisance
claim under federal common law in a suit brought by private par-
12 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1149-53 (U. Md. 1974). Defendant City of Baltimore Public
Works applied to the EPA for a discharge permit for the Back River waste water treat-
ment plant on October 4, 1973. Id. at 1150. Suit was not commenced until December
1973. Id. at 1149. While the suit was pending the defendants received a permit from
the Maryland Department of Public Works, with the authorization of the EPA. 539 F.2d
at 1007.
13 375 F. Supp. 1148, 1 153 (U. Md. 1974). A nuisance may be generally defined
as an unreasonable interference which causes substantial harm to the injured party's in-
terest. See 6A AMERICAN LAW OF Pnormry § 28.23 (A.j. Casner ed. 1954). Private nui-
sances are related to a possessory interest in land, while public nuisances cover a wide
range of activities which in some way affect adversely the public health or welfare, Id.
The American Law of Property distinguishes the two types of nuisance as follows :
`Such interferences as unreasonably affect the quiet and peaceable enjoyment of one's
land are ... private nuisances .... Behavior, on the other hand, which impairs the
health, safety, morals and comfort of the general community without necessarily harm-
ing particular property rights in any special way is a public nuisance." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
14 See 375 F. Stipp. 1148, 1153 (D. Md. 1974). The Supreme Court has ruled that
the federal district courts have jurisdiction over common law nuisance claims as a fed-
eral question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S.
91, 100 (1972).
The plaintiffs' attempt to amend their complaint raised an interesting jurisdic-
tional question. Under § 1365(a) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, the district court has jurisdiction over a suit for violation of the statute
without regard to the amount in controversy. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. V 1975).
However, at the time of suit in order for the district court to have jurisdiction to hear a
federal question under 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), the amount in controversy had to be shown
to be greater than $10,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). The Jones Falls case thus raised
the question whether the plaintiff's must allege the jurisdictional amount to remain in
federal court when they originally came into court on a basis not requiring such a show-
ing. The dissent raised this point and urged that it be briefed on remand. 539 F.2d at
1013 n.11 (dissenting opinion). After the case was decided, however, 1331(a) was
amended to remove the jurisdictional amount requirement in suits against an adminis-
trative agency. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Dec. 1976 Pamph. 4, Part 2). Thus, the plaintiffs
in Junes Falls would have been able to maintain their federal common law claim in the
district court. The question raised by the dissent would still be at issue, however, in suits
brought under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act against private individuals. As
to whether plaintiffs in that instance could make the requisite showing, see Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98 (1972), for the notion that the interest in the
maintenance of clean water is sufficient to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement
of 28 U.S.C. 1331(a).
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ties.''' The district court concluded that a federal common law nui-
sance claim was limited to actions brought by governmental entities.' 6
The plaintiffs appealed this determination to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which heard the case en bane.
The appeal squarely presented the court for the first time with the
question whether the federal common law of nuisance could be
applied in a suit by private individuals seeking to abate pollution of an
intrastate stream." A majority of the court in an opinion by Chief
Judge Haynsworth affirmed the district court opinion, and HELD:
the federal common law of nuisance may not be applied to a suit in-
stituted by private parties to abate pollution of an intrastate stream."
The majority ruled that the federal common law of nuisance applied
only to those cases seeking "the abatement of public nuisances in in-
terstate controversies where the complainant is a state and the offenders
are creating extraterritorial harm."" The majority thus found that
plaintiffs had failed to set forth a federal common law claim because
there was no claim of right by a state and because the controversy was
intrastate in nature, with no allegation of an out-of-state effect. 2° The
majority further declared that the federal courts could not use federal
common law in a local controversy to impose stricter standards than
those established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments."
A strong three judge dissent argued that federal common law
should be applicable to such suits and urged that the case be re-
manded to the district court. The dissenting judges construed the
federal common law nuisance doctrine broadly, arguing first that it
applied to all navigable waters rather than only those which are in-
terstate, 22
 and second that such a nuisance claim could be brought by
private parties as well as by governmental entities." The dissent con-
" 375 F. Supp, 1148, 1153-55 (D. Md, 1974), The court based its decision on its
interpretation of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). 375 F. Supp. at
1153-55.
1 " Id, at 1153.
" 539 F.2d at 1007.
"Id. The court based its decision not on a lack of jurisdiction, however, but
upon a determination on the merits that plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. at 1008. The effect of the court of ap-
peals decision, therefore, in contrast to that of the district court, was not to find that the
federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over private party federal common law
nuisance suits, but rather that the federal courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction
may determine that the private parties have failed to state a claim for which relief may
be granted. The case is thus presented in a Rule 12(b)(6) posture under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
" 539 F.2d at 1009. The court admitted, however, that a state was not a neces-
sary party to a federal common law nuisance suit, if its interests were sufficiently in-
volved in the action. Id. at n.8. Other courts have limited federal common law nuisance
suits to governmental entities rather than to states. See cases cited at note 77 hyra.
2° 539 F.2d at 1010.,
11 1d, at 1009.
22 /d. at 1013 (dissenting opinion).
23 1d. at 1014 (dissenting opinion).
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tended that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments
exhibit a federal policy in favor of private party suits under federal
common law." The dissent also found that the expansion of the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act to cover tributaries of navigable wa-
ters, and the broad definition of navigable waters in statutes, reg-
ulations and case law demonstrated that federal common law nui-
sance need not be restricted to interstate waters. 25 The dissent con-
cluded accordingly that the pollution of Jones Falls, as a navigable wa-
ter, presented a federal question over which the district court had
jurisdiction."
The importance of the decision in Jones Falls lies primarily in its
restrictive effect upon the use of the federal common law of public
nuisance. The case stands as the latest attempt to narrow the federal
common law of nuisance which was broadly enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee.'
In City of Milwaukee the Supreme Court held that a federal
common law nuisance claim alleging pollution of an interstate body of
water may be brought by a state, and that the district courts have
jurisdiction over such a claim as a federal question." The case left
open, however, the questions of whether the right to pursue a federal
common law nuisance claim was limited to states," and whether the
claim could be made only with respect to pollution of interstate bodies
of water." The ambiguities left unresolved in City of Milwaukee have
produced a body of decisions in the district courts and the courts of
appeals as to I) who may bring a federal common law public nuisance
suit and 2) what must be the nature of the body of water in ques-
24 Id. at 1012-13 (dissenting opinion).
xsId. at 1011, 1013 (dissenting opinion).
'" Id, at 1014 (dissenting opinion). The dissenting judges also considered the
question whether the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments preempted the
use of federal common law in the area of water pollution, an argument made by the
defendants, id. at 1011 (dissenting opinion), but not addressed by the majority opinion.
The dissent urged that the question of preemption be resolved on remand with due re-
gard given to the functions of the federal common law to provide uniform rules and to
fill in statutory interstices. Id. at 1010, 1014 (dissenting opinion). This preemption prob-
lem was recognized when the Supreme Court expounded the common law public nui-
sance doctrine in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972). The Court in City of
Milwaukee observed that eventually statutory law might preempt the common law of
nuisance, but held that the then current act, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
33 U.S.C. § 1151 el seq. (1970), did not do so. 406 U.S. at 107. Later cases, including
decisions since the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 were
enacted, have continued to hold that the common law is not preempted by the statute.
See, e.g.. United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556,
558.59 (N.D. Ill. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145,
149-50 (D. Vt. 1972), offd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976
(1974).
27
 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
28 Id. at 99.
22 See id. at 91.
22 See id.
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tion.3 ' The Jones Falls case specifically addresses these issues, both of
which emphasize the delicate problem of the federal-state relationship
in the area of environmental enforcement.
This note will briefly consider the authority of federal courts to
create substantive common law and will then examine the federal .
common law of nuisance created by the Supreme Court in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee. The questions whether the federal common law nui-
sance doctrine is limited to suits brought by governmental entities or
to suits seeking the abatement of pollution in interstate waters will be
analyzed in light of the majority and dissenting opinions in Jones Falls.
Finally, it will be submitted that in light of the federal policies in the
water pollution control area, the majority in Jones Falls was correct in
its limitation of the federal common law nuisance doctrine to govern-
mental entities, but was incorrect in its determination not to apply the
doctrine to pollution of intrastate navigable waters.
I. THE FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF NUISANCE
In spite of the announced demise of "federal general common
law" in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins," the federal courts in the de-
cades since that landmark decision have fashioned federal common law
in certain specialized areas. This development has been particularly
notable in such fields as commercial" and labor law, 34 although most
recently, some significant progress has been evidenced with respect to
environmental concerns. 35 Because of the general reluctance since Erie
31 See, e.g., Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975), mod-
ified on other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976); Stream Pollution Control Bd. v.
United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (7th Cir. 1975); Board of Supervisors
v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D. Va. 1976); United States v. Lindsay, 357
F. Supp. 784, 794 (E.D. N.V. 1973); United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. III. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D. Vt. 1972), aff'd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
32 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie overruled the long-standing doctrine of Swift v. Ty-
son, 41 U,S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), which had permitted the federal courts in diversity
jurisdiction cases to distinguish between questions of a "local" nature, in which state law
was binding on the federal courts, and "question[s] of a ... general nature," in which
the federal courts could apply a general body of law. Id. at 18. Erie's rejection of Swift
was emphatic:
There is no federal general common law. Congress has no power to de-
clare substantive rules of common law applicable in a state whether they be
local in their nature or "general," be they commercial law or a part of the
law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts.
304 U.S. al 78.
"See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943);
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309
U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940).
" See, e.g., Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 102 (1962);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).




to create federal common law, the federal courts have had to find
some compelling rationale to bypass the operation of state law. Gener-
ally the courts have used one of four techniques to create this "spe-
cialized federal common law":" 1) the filling in of statutory in-
terstices; 37 2) the implication of additional remedies from a federal
statute; 38 3) the derivation of a power to make substantive law from a
jurisdictional grant;" and 4) the "spontaneous generation" of federal
substantive law when important federal policy considerations so dic-
tate. 4° Particularly in the case of the so-called spontaneous generation
of substantive federal common law, a court's decision to create federal
law is underscored by considerations of the need for uniformity in the
field,'" and of the existence of a federal policy or interest which
'" Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N. Y.U. L.
REv. 383, 405, 421 (19(14) (hereinafter Friendly).
Federal judicial lawmaking by filling in statutory interstices is the most basic
Barra of common lawmaking and is an undisputed role of the federal courts. See, e.g.,
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), in which Mr. Justice Holmes in dis-
sent expressed his understanding of federal judicial lawmaking: "I recognize without
hesitation that judges do and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they
are confined from molar to molecular motions." Id. at 221. See also Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 CoLust, L. Rev. 1024, 1026 -27
(1967).
38 In the remedies cases the problem is generally to determine what parties are
entitled to relief from a statutory violation or whether relief' in a form other than that
statutorily mandated may be obtained. See, e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432-33 (1964) (implying a private remedy for an individual stockholder who claimed to
suffer harm from a corporation's violation of Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S.
482, 491-92 (1960) (implying injunctive relief from violations under the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 40l et seq. (1970), where the Act provides only for
fines and imprisonment for such violations); Board of County Counters v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343, 349 (1939) (the question whether a judgment in an action by the
United States to recover county tax payments on behalf of an Indian should include in-
terest on the illegally exacted payments must be determined by judicial implication from
the grant of the existing federal right).
39 Thc derivation of federal common lawmaking power from a jurisdictional
grant has been an important Factor in creating federal common law in the areas of' ad-
miralty, suits between the states, and labor. P. BA -rok. P. MIsItEIN, a SilArnto, & H.
WESCHLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 786 (2(1
ed. 1973). in the landmark case, Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, '353 U.S. 448
(1957), the Supreme Court implied from the jurisdictional grant in section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), an authorization to
create federal common law and to fashion that law in accordance with the policy ex-
pressed in federal statutory law. 353 U.S. at 450-51, 456-57.
4 " See Friendly, supra note 36, at 421.
4 ' Perhaps the most important case representative of this latter group of "policy"
cases is Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). In Clearfield the Su-
preme Court held that federal common law must govern questions involving the United
States as an issuer of commercial paper because of the need for uniformity in such a
complex area. Id. at 366-67.
iRleasons which may make state law at times the appropriate federal rule
are singularly inappropriate here. The issuance of commercial paper by
the United States is on a vast scale and transactions in that paper from is-
suance to payment will commonly occur in several states. The application
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would be furthered by judicial lawmaking. 42
In the environmental protection area, the Supreme Court has
focused on policy considerations in formulating federal common law.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee," the leading Supreme Court case in fed-
eral nuisance law, exemplifies these policy considerations." In City of
Milwaukee the state of Illinois presented the United States Supreme
Court with a motion to file a bill under the Court's original jurisdic-
tion for abatement of a public nuisance created by the clumping of
of state law ... would subject the rights and duties of the United Stales to
exceptional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by mak-
ing identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the several
states. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain.
Id. at 367. See also ivy Broadcasting Co. v. AT&T Co., 391 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.
1968) (questions concerning interstate communications must be resolved by a uniform
federal c(rtinnon law).
"See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbath)°, 376 U.S. 398, 425-27 (1964);
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957); Sola Electric Co.
v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942); D'Oench, Dultme & Co. v. FDIC,
315 U.S. 447, 457-59 (1942); Deitrick v. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200-01 (1940); Hinder-
lider v. La Plant River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 1.10 (1938).
° 406 U.S. 91 (1972). Illinois v. City of Milwaukee represents a fundamental
change in the Supreme Court's view of the federal courts' role in environmental nui-
sance cases, and therefore is the appropriate starting point for discussion. The case im-
plicitly overrruled a 1971 case, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 ,U.S. 493 (1971),
in which the Court had refused to exercise its original jurisdiction over a suit by Ohio
against extra-territorial polluters. See 406 U.S. at 102 n.3. In Wyandotte the Court re-
mitted the case to the state court, ruling that the federal district courts lacked either di-
versity or federal question jurisdiction, and further stating as dictum that if a federal
district court could obtain jurisdiction over the controversy, it would be obliged to apply
state law to the question. Wyandotte, 401 U.S. at 498 n.3.
For a history of public nuisance as an environmental remedy, see Note, 14 B.C.
1 ND. & Com. L. REV. 767 (1972-73).
44 The City of Milwaukee Court also asserted that the basic interests of federalism
and the desire for uniform rules which underlie action to abate pollution of an in-
terstate body of water required the application of federal common law to the con-
troversy. 406 U.S. at 105 n.6. This concern for uniformity, however, played a much
smaller role in the Court's decision to apply federal common law than did the Court's
consideration of the federal policy toward water pollution control. The Coon further
observed that the use of federal common law to abate pollution creating a public nui-
sance was not inconsistent with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, since section
10(b) ()I' the Act stated that "State and interstate action to abate pollution of interstate
or navigable waters shall be encouraged and shall not ... be displaced by Federal en-
forcement action." 406 U.S. at 104, quoting § 10(b) of' the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1160(h) (1970) (since amended). The decision to permit Illinois to
pursue its nuisance claim was therefore in accord with expressed federal policy.
On the need for uniformity as a basis for federal common law creation, see also
Woods & Reed, The Supreme Court and Interstate Environmental Quality: Some Notes on the
Wyandotte Case, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 691 (1970) (hereinafter Woods & Reed), in which the
authors advocated the use of the federal district courts as an alternative forum to the
Supreme Court in interstate pollution cases involving a state as a party'. Id. at 701. The
authors argued that such suits called for the application of federal common law, be-
cause of the federal interest in resolving interstate conflicts and the need for a uniform
approach to problems concerning interstate waters. Id. at 703-06, 71 1-12. The authors
also argued that the policy of federal water pollution control legislation made appropri-
ate the use of federal common law in such cases. Id. at 713-14. It is interesting to note
. 936
NOTES
raw and inadequately treated sewage into Lake Michigan by four Wis-
consin cities, an impermissible activity under Illinois law.45
The Court held that, although it had original jurisdiction over
the suit, such jurisdiction was not necessarily exclusive." In order to
decline to exercise jurisdiction, however, the Court had to find a basis
for federal jurisdiction in the district court.'"
Since the district court could not obtain jurisdiction based on di-
versity of citizenship," the only possible basis for district court juris-
diction was a determination that Illinois' nuisance claim was a federal
common law claim arising under the laws of the United States under
28 U.S.C. § 1381(4 4" The Court's determination that the suit pre-
sented a federal question was based on two premises. The Court first
determined that claims under federal common law as well as claims
based upon statutes are claims under the laws of the United States for
that when the Supreme Ctiurt in City rf Milwaukee established the federal district court,
applying federal common law, as the appropriate forum f o r Illinois' public nuisance
claim, it minimized the interest in uniformity and the federalism concern and looked
more to the policy exhibited by federal environmental legislation. Sri! 406 U.S. at 101-04
& 105 11.6. But see text at notes 81-85 infra where it is suggested that the Court
nevertheless relied heavily on the fact that the state was a party to the suit in choosing
to apply federal common law to the controversy.
" 406 U.S. at 93. Plaintiffs alleged that about 200 million gallons of sewage and
other wastes were dumped daily in the Milwaukee areas. Id.
" Id. at 98, 108. The circumstances in which the Supreme Court may maintain
original jurisdiction are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1970). That section provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
of:
(1) All controversies between two or more States;
(2) All actions or proceedings against ambassadors or other
public ministers of foreign states or their domestics or domestic set--
• vants, not inconsistent with the law of nations.
(b) The Supreme Court shall have original but not exclusive juris-
diction of:
(I) All actions or proceedings brought by ambassadors or
other public ministers of foreign states or to which consuls or vice
consuls of foreign states are parties;
(2) All controversies between the United States and a State;
(3) All actions or proceedings by a State against the citizens of
another State or against aliens.
The Supreme Court in City ele Milwaukee found that political subdivisions of a state are
not "states" for the purposes of § 1251(a)(1), and that the state of Wisconsin was not. a
necessary party to the suit. 406 U.S. at 98. Hence the Court found that Illinois' suit
against Wisconsin cities did not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of § 1251(a). Id.
47 406 U.S. at 93.
" A suit between a state and a citizen of another state, in the instant case a politi-
cal subdivision of that state, is not considered to be a suit between "citizens of diffiirent
states" under the diversity statute. Id. at 97 11.1, The diversity section, 28 U.S.C. §
1332(0(1) ( i 970), provides:
(a) The district courts shalt have original jurisdiction of all civil ac-
tions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States....
" Federal question jurisdiction is placed in the district courts under 28 U,S.C.A.
§ 1331(a) (Dec. 1976 Pamph. 4, Part 2) which provides:
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the purposes of Section 1331(a). 5° Secondly, the Court found that the
jurisdictional amount was met because of the interest in having clean
interstate waters."
The Court's decision that Illinois should be permitted to seek re-
lief under federal common law was based on its view of the federal
policy toward pollution of interstate waters as discerned from congres-
sional legislation. The Court found that federal legislative enactments
since the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 52 had be-
come increasingly strong in their control over pollution." The Court
noted that the 1899 Act had been extended and strengthened by the
enactment of boh the National Environment Policy Act of 1969, 54
which established a federal policy to promote harmony between man
and the environment, 55
 and the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act." The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as then amended, 57
declared as its purpose. the improvement of the nation's water re-
sources and the institution of a national policy of water pollution con-
tro1,58
 and to this end provided that the pollution of interstate or
navigable waters was subject to abatement." Additionally the Court
found "an increasing [congressional] concern with the quality of the
The district courts shalt have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and arises under the Constitutiim, laws, or
treaties of the United States except that no such sum or value shall be re-
quired in any such action brought against the United States, any agency
thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.
" 406 U.S. at 99. The Court relied upon Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 389, 393 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting and concurring);
Texas v. Pankey, 441 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1971); Ivy Broadcasting Co. v. AT&T
Co., 391 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1968). 406 U.S. at 99-100.
5 '406 U.S. at 98. "The considerable interests involved in the purity of interstate
waters would seem to put beyond quesiton the jurisdictional amount provided in §
1331(a)." Id.
"33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. (1970). The 1899 Act in part prohibited the discharge of
refuse other than sewage into any navigable water or tributary thereof. Id. at § 407. Sec-
tion 407 provides:
It shall not be lawful to throw ... any refuse matter of any kind or
description whatever other than that flowing from streets and sewers and
passing therefrom in a liquid state, into any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water from which the same
shall float or be washed into such navigable water ....
" 406 U.S. at 101.
s4
 Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) ).
" 42 U.S.C. 11 4321, 4331 (1970).
" Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1158 (1948) (codified with amendments at 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et
seq. (1970), current version at 33 U.S.C. 1 1251 et seq. (Supp. V 1975) ).
37 33 U.S.C. § 1151 et seq. (1970).
3"
 33 U.S.C. § 115I(a) (1970) provided: The purpose of this chapter is to en-
hance the quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national policy for
the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution."
59
 33 U.S.C. § 1160(a) (1970) provided:
(a) Pollution of waters subject to abatement.
The pollution of interstate or navigable waters in or adjacent to any
State or States (whether the matter causing or contributing to such pollu-
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aquatic environment"" as evidenced by the Fish and Wildlife Act of
1956," which declared a congressional policy to manage properly the
nation's fish and wildlife resources, 62 and by the Fish and Wildlife
Coordination Act," which declared its purpose to be the recognition
of the importance of the nation's wildlife resources." In the Court's
view, these enactments expressed a strong congressional policy of
maintaining control over the environment and of actively encouraging
the abatement of pollution in the nation's waterways.
While the Court noted the express declaration in section 1(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Act that it shall be federal policy "to rec-
ognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights
of the States in preventing and controlling water pollution,"" it
nevertheless found that under the Act federal law ultimately pre-
vails." The Court thus found that the trend of federal legislation and
the specific policy of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in-
dicated a federal policy toward water pollution control which sup-
ported the development of federal common law.
In addition to adhering to statutory federal policy, the allowance
of a federal common law claim in City of Milwaukee was also in accord
with earlier Supreme Court cases and with post-Erie federal common
law cases. Earlier public nuisance cases and water apportionment cases
brought under the Court's original jurisdiction indicate that histori-
cally the Court has applied federal common law in such suits brought
by a state." The Court relied particularly on Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co.," an early air pollution case in which the Supreme Court held
that the state as a quasi-sovereign could demand relief from extra-
territorial pollution in the federal courts. 6" Granting injunctive relief
to Georgia, the Court found that the state could assert rights in its
quasi-sovereign capacity against citizens in other states, where private
citizens might lack such standing. 70 The Tennessee Copper case is an
example, then, of the kind of assistance which the federal courts may
thin is discharged directly into such waters or reaches such waters after
discharge into a tributary of such waters), which endangers the health or
welfare of any persons, shall he subject to abatement as provided in this
chapter.
6" 406 U.S. at 102.
" Ch. 1036, 70 Stat. 1119 (codified at 16 U.S.C. 	 742a- (1970)).
"a !d. at 742(a).
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 661.666c (1970).
"M. at § 661.
66 Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified with amendments at. 33 U.S.C.
1151(b) (1970)).
" 406 U.S. at 102. "But the Act makes clear that it is federal, not state, law that
in the end controls the pollution of interstate or navigable waters." Id.
' 1 See cases cited in 406 U.S. at 104-07,
"206 U.S. 230 (1907). In the Tennessee Copper case the state of Georgia sued to
abate air pollution caused by a private company in Tennessee which was seriously
damaging Georgia's forests, orchards, and crops. Id. at 236.
66 Id. at 297-38.
r" Id. at 238.
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provide to the states to encourage state action to abate pollution. That
the Supreme Court was willing to provide such assistance in the ab-
sence of manifestations of congressional policy suggests that the fash-
ioning of a federal remedy would be even more appropriate when a
clear federal policy has been expressed, as was true at the time Illinois
v. City of Milwaukee was decided. The Tennessee Copper case thus served
as a useful model for the modern creation of federal common law,
since its result was in accordance with the policy expressed in the Fed-
eral Water Pollution Control Act.
In contrast to the Tennessee Copper case, however, the City of Mil-
waukee decision did not rely on the Court's original jurisdiction to
permit Illinois' nuisance claim. Instead, it shifted the focus of common
law nuisance cases by finding that the claim presented a federal ques-
tion. In so doing, the Court looked to the recent opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Texas v. Pan-
key. 7 ' In Pankey the court of appeals found that the state of Texas was
entitled to bring a federal common law nuisance claim against private
citizens in New Mexico to abate pollution in a stream flowing through
the two states." The court determined that a state has a "quasi-
sovereign ecological right" under federal common law to be free from
extraterritorial interference with its environment. 73 As to the exercise
of this right, the court held that such a suit need not be brought
under the Supreme Court's original jurisdicition and commended the
state's institution of an action in district court as showing a concern
not to overburden the Supreme Court."
In City of Milwaukee the Supreme Court thus derived a modern
federal common law of nuisance from both pre-Erie federal common
law cases and modern federal common law cases, and from the gen-
eral federal policy toward water pollution control. The Court ex-
pressed this doctrine in very general terms: "When we deal with air
and water in their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal
common law...."" This enunciation of a broad doctrine, however,
must be considered in light of the fact that Illinois v. City of Milwaukee
was a suit brought by a state to abate pollution of an interstate body
of water." Thus the case is susceptible to two interpretations. Nar-
rowly construed, City of Milwaukee simply holds that a state has a cause
of action under the federal common law of nuisance to sue another
state instrumentality for pollution of an interstate, navigable body of
water. Under such a view, despite the Court's policy discussion, the
character of the parties and of the body of water being polluted are
seen as determinative factors in the Court's decision to provide Illinois
with a federal forum. Broadly construed, however, the holding in ll-
11 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971).
"Id. at 237-40.
" Id. at 240.
"Id. at 239.




linois v. City of Milwaukee suggests that the federal interest in maintain-
ing the purity of the nation's waters gives rise to a federal common
law cause of action to abate water pollution, regardless of the charac-
ter of the injured party or whether the water polluted is an interstate
body. Under such an interpretation the case may be viewed essentially
as a broad policy decision. 77
II. PERMISSIBILITY OF SUITS BY PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS
A. Majority View in Jones Falls
In the majority's opinion, the rationale supporting the applica-
tion of federal common law in Pankey and City of Milwaukee were ab-
sent where a private party, not a state, sought relief under federal
common law. Since the Pankey and City of Milwaukee cases pitted the
interests of one state against another, the majority viewed those cases
as requiring the application of a body of law which would not treat un-
fairly the interests of either state." Accordingly, the majority found
that the application of federal common law in a case where one state
"infringes upon the environmental and ecological rights of another
" Since Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, several federal district courts have ex-
panded the scope of the federal common law nuisance action to include suits brought
by both the federal government and local governments. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors
v. United States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D. Va. 1976) (county board of supervisors
permissible plaintiff in federal common law nuisance suit); United States ex rel. Scott v.
United States Steel Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (federal government
permissible plaintiff in federal common law nuisance suit); United States v. Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc., 346 F, Supp. 145, 149-50 (D. Vt. 1972), affd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2c1
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (same). Rat see United States v. Lindsay, 357
F. Supp. 784, 794 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), in which the district court, while delaying a ruling
on the merits of the adequacy of a federal common law nuisance claim by the Federal
government, suggested, but did not hold, that the nuisance remedy developed in Il-
linois v. City of Milwaukee was restricted to suits between states.
In the limited instances where the courts have articulated the reasons for this ex-
pansion, they have .found that the governmental unit has a proprietary interest in the
polluted waters similar to that of a state. United States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel
Corp., 356 F. Supp. 556, 558 (N.D. W. 1973); United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons,
Inc., 346 F. Supp. 145, 148-49 (D. Vt. 1972), affd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974). In the case of extension of the doctrine to suits by local
governments, while no rationale has been expressed, it may be argued that a local gov-
ernmental unit has a similar proprietary interest to that of the state and federal . gov-
ernments. See text at notes 88-97 infra for a discussion of this proprietary interest ra-
tionale.
Since City of Milwaukee, the few lower courts to consider the question have held
that the federal common law nuisance doctrine applies only to cases involving interstate
bodies of water. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975), modified
on other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. United
States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D.Va. 1976). See text at notes 129-31 infra for a discus-
sion of the Reserve Mining case. The usefulness of these cases in resolving the un-
answered question of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee is questionable, however, since they
largely fail to advance a reasoned basis for their approach.
" 539 F.2d at 1008.
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... is an acceptable accommodation of state and national interests." 79
Additionally, the majority found that despite the federal interest in-
dicated in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments in
interstate and navigable waters, the thrust of the Act is toward state ac-
tion to abate pollution." Where the plaintiffs were private citizens
suing their own sovereign, the court was thus unable to find a need
for federal intervention based upon either a desire to insure fairness
to conflicting interests or upon a sufficient Federal interest in water
pollution control.
The majority's first conclusion that the development of federal
common law in the water pollution control area was based upon a
consideration of the state interests involved appears justified in light
of the analysis used in recent federal common law nuisance cases. The
Supreme Court's reliance in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee on Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co.sl and Texas v. Pankey 82
 indicates the important
weight the Court gave to the state character of the plaintiff in its deci-
sion to permit Illinois to bring a suit to abate pollution under federal
common law. For example, in City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court
quoted a part of the Tennessee Copper decision which specifically dis-
tinguished such a nuisance suit by a state from an action by a private
party.
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a
sovereign that the air over its territory should not be pol-
luted ... by the act of persons beyond its control .... If
any such demand is to be enforced this must be, not-
withstanding the hesitation that we might feel if the suit
were between private parties ... . 83
It is significant that the Court relied on such language in making its
determination that Illinois could maintain a suit at common law, since
the language of Tennessee Copper makes clear that the state character
of the plaintiff was the determinative factor which enabled it to bring
suit. In Texas v. Pankey the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
specifically limited its creation of federal common law to providing a
right to an aggrieved state to halt pollution by foreign citizens. 84 The
City of Milwaukee Court's reliance on the case again indicates that de-
spite its vague language the Court followed a rationale in permitting
Illinois' suit which was based in large part on the right of the states to
maintain their sovereignty as against foreign states and citizens.
79 Id. at 1008-09.
"Id. at 1009.
8 ' 206 U.S. 230 (1907). See text at notes 68 -70 supra for discussion of the case.
62
 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971). See text at notes 71-74 supra for a discussion of
the case.
83
 406 U.S. at 104-05, quoting Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 238.
84
 441 F.2d at 241. The state character of the plaintiff was central to the court's
discussion, as shown below.
As the field of common law has been given necessary expansion into mat-
ters of federal concern and relationship (where no applicable federal stat-
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The Jones Falls majority's second ground of decision, its view that
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments are supportive
of state action, is also buttressed by the Supreme Court's decision in Il-
linois v. City of Milwaukee. The Court's upholding of Illinois' claim in
that case may be seen not so much as an expansion of federal activity
in the water pollution control area, but rather as an attempt to
strengthen the state's enforcement activity. Indeed, the Court itself
stated that permitting a federal common law nuisance suit was not in-
consistent with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, since the use
of federal common law served the policy of the Act to encourage state
pollution abatement practices." By contrast, in the Jones Falls case, the
application of federal common law to permit suit against the state
would operate to discourage the state's participation in water pollution
control.
Despite the strong support in the language of Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee for the proposition that the state character of the plaintiff is
a prerequisite to a federal common law nuisance action, the Court's
decision also sets forth alternative bases for applying federal common
law which do not rely on the character of the plaintiff. In a footnote
to its opinion the Court asserted that the desire for uniform rules and
the basic interests of federalism which underlie actions to abate pollu-
tion of an interstate body of water also required the application of fed-
eral law to the controversy." Thus, it may reasonably be contended
that City of Milwaukee leaves open whether the state character of the
plaintiff is a prerequisite to the decision to fashion a federal remedy
or whether it is only one of many factors which influenced the Court's
decision.
While considerations of uniformity and federalism initially sug-
gest alternatives to requiring a state plaintiff for the creation of fed-
eral common law, neither the concern for uniformity nor the
federal interest in dispute resolution appears very significant in cases in
which a state is not a party. In the instant case, the federal interest in
providing a disinterested forum to disputing states is obviously in-
applicable. More importantly, however, the application of federal
common law to favor a private citizen over a state would upset the
federal/state relationship contemplated by the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments."' The state character of a plaintiff then
ute exists, as there does not here), the ecological rights of a State in the
improper impairment of them from sources outside the State's own terri-
tory, now would and should, we think, be held to be a matter having basis
and standard in federal common law .... Id. at 240.
The Pankey court also based its decision to apply federal common law on a need for uni-
formity in the law, but again the court focused on the desirability of a uniform rule
with regard to "the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by
sources outside its domain." Id. at 241.
"406 U.S. at 104.
"Id. at 105 n.6.
"T The federal policy to encourage state pollution abatement activity is set forth
in	 1251(b) of Title 33, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. V 1975). For a discussion of the
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does seem to be a prerequisite to the creation of a federal common
law remedy.
This conclusion is buttressed by a review of the cases following
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. These cases have expanded the applicabil-
ity of the federal common law nuisance doctrine but do not support
any such expansion in the Jones Falls case. For example, in both United
States ex rel. Scott v. United States Steel Corp. 88 and United States v. Ira S.
Bushey & Sons, Inc., 89
 federal district courts found that the United
States has a cause of action under federal common law to sue private
parties to abate a nuisance created by pollution of an interstate body
of water. 9° In both of these decisions, the district courts relied on the
existence of the federal proprietary interest in interstate and navigable
waters in permitting the United States to maintain its suit." The
source of the federal proprietary interest was found in the policy
statements expressed in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 92
and in the 1972 Amendments93 thereto.
In a more recent case, Board of Supervisors v. United States," a dis-
trict court did not question the right of a county board of supervisors
concerns of federalism which demand application of federal common law in suits by
states, see Woods & Reed, supra note 44, at 703-06, 711-12.
" 356 F. Supp. 556 (N.D. III. 1973).
99
 346 F. Supp. 145 (D. Vt. 1972), affd, 487 F.2d 1393 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974).
"Scoit, 356 F. Supp. at 558; see Bushey, 346 F. Supp. at 149-50.
91 In United States Steel the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois upheld a complaint filed by the state of Illinois and the United States against
United States Steel Corporation to abate under the federal common law of nuisance the
discharge of waste water from a plant located within the state into Lake Michigan. 356
F. Supp. at 558. The court. upheld the common law cause of action in reliance upon Il-
linois v. City of Milwaukee. Id. The district court fotind that the United States was a
permissible plaintiff in a federal common law nuisance suit, since like the state govern-
ment, it had a proprietary interest in the water being polluted. Id. The court further
found that the federal government's interest in the development of a uniform standard
permitted the government to bring suit under common law nuisance. Id. For a discus-
sion arguing that the federal government should not have been permitted to bring suit,
see Note, 15 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REV. 795 (1973-74),
In United States v. Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc., the United States, District Court
for the District of Vermont upheld a complaint brought by the United States against
corporations engaged in transporting oil across Lake Champlain. 346 F. Supp. at 146-
48. The complaint sought a permanent injunction requiring defendants to follow cer-
tain safety regulations in order to diminish the possibility of further oil spills into the
Lake. Id. at 146-47. The court held that the complaint stated a claim under the federal
common law of nuisance and found that the federal government's interest in water
quality permitted the United States to sue at federal common law to abate water pollu-
tion. Id. at 148-49. "The national interest in the quality of air and water in their am-
bient or interstate aspects has been manifested in executive statements, congressional
legislation, and administrative agency regulation. It is settled that the Attorney General
by virtue of his office may sue to protect that federal interest." Id. at 149 (footnotes
omitted).
92 Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948), as most recently amended by 79 Stat. 903 (1965) and
codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1970).
9" 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Supp. V 1975).
" 408 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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to sue to abate a public nuisance under federal common law. 95 While
the court fails to explain its apparent lack of concern about mechani-
cally extending the City of Milwaukee doctrine to local government
units," the extension may be rationalized under the proprietary in-
terest theory used to apply the common law nuisance doctrine in
suits by the federal government. As a local governmental unit, a
county board of supervisors has a proprietary interest in the air and
waters of the county. While such an interest is more circumscribed
than the federal government's proprietary interest, the interests are
nevertheless similar in nature and would equally serve as a basis from
which to construct a federal common law right of action. 97
The proprietary interest approach taken by these recent cases
provides no basis for upholding the private party federal common law
claim in the Jones Falls case. As private parties, the plaintiffs in Jones
Falls clearly lack the governmental proprietary interest upon which
those cases rely. A private citizen's interest in promoting a uniform
federal rule, while it arguably does exist, may not be so readily as-
serted by him as it may be by the federal government. While it is a logical
cal result to find that the federal government and perhaps local gov-
ernments have the same rights as do state quasi-sovereigns, it becomes
far more difficult to infer from City of Milwaukee that the citizens of a
state possess a right which has been developed to protect the state in
its capacity as a quasi-sovereign. Thus in Jones Falls the policies which
led to the use of federal common law in United States Steel and Bushey
are inapposite: the private party plaintiffs in Jones Falls cannot allege a
" Id. at 562. In that case the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
held that it had jurisdiction to hear a claim in common law nuisance brought by a
county board of supervisors against the District of Columbia for operating a prison, lo-
cated upon land legally held by the United States, so as to cause a nuisance by polluting
air and water in the county. Id. at 559, 561-62. The court did not even question the
county board's right to bring suit, but merely interpreted City of Milwaukee to mean
"that the law to be applied in common law actions to abate pollution is federal law." Id.
at 562. The district court did raise the issues of preemption of common law and the
necessity of the waters being interstate before refusing a motion to dismiss the common
law count of the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. Id.
96 Id.
97 While the language of the decision in the City of Milwaukee case does not
phrase its decision in terms of a "proprietary interest," its reliance on case law which
upheld the quasi-sovereign right of the states to demand relief from pollution suggests
a rationale which considers the proprietary nature of the plaintiffs interest. See discus-
sion of the City of Milwaukee Court's reliance on Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.. 206
U.S. 230 (1907), and Texas v. Pankey. 441 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1971), in text at notes
81-84 supra.
Because the Board of Supervisors controversy essentially involves two states, the de-
cision to permit suit under federal common law in that case can also be seen as reflect-
ing the federal court's desire to provide the parties with a fair forum. Such a problem is
nut presented in Jones Falls, in which the private party plaintiffs may readily seek relief
in state court under state nuisance doctrine. See 539 F.2d at 1009. It should be noted,
however, that plaintiffs may be unsuccessful in state court, since the charge might be
defended successfully on the basis of the permit to dump waste which the City of Bal-
timore obtained in accordance with the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments.
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proprietary interest in the polluted waters, and they lack the federal
government's interest in the promotion of a uniform national stan-
dard.
The majority's interpretation of the federal common law nui-
sance doctrine also avoids the complicated interplay between federal
common and statutory law and the notice problem which would result
were the plaintiff in Jones Falls permitted to bring suit in federal court.
With the enactment of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the
states were put on notice as to their roles and responsibilities in water
pollution enforcement. In the instant case the state of Maryland was
given to understand that it could continue to dump municipal sewage
as long as it acquired a permit under the Act.° 8 Were the federal dis-
trict court to declare impermissible that which a statute constitution-
ally permits, a significant notice problem would result, since the mean-
ing of the statute would become extremely unclear. In the Jones Falls
case, the notice problem is exacerbated by the fact that the state is a
party. The state, having been required to follow the federal statute,
should not then be placed in the position of having to defend in fed-
eral court its activities carried out pursuant to the federal statute
against its own citizens. Chief Judge Haynsworth accordingly raised
the problem in his opinion:
Indeed, it would be an anomaly to hold that there was a
body of federal common law which proscribes conduct
which the 1972 Act of Congress legitimates. The de-
fendants are in compliance with the statute. They are
operating under a permit issued in accordance with the
statute and the authorization of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. The Congress and the Executive Department,
acting through the Environmental Protecion Agency, have
declared their conduct lawful until the time for the applica-
tion of more restrictive standards. While the state courts are
free to apply state nuisance law more rigidly, a federal
court in such a local controversy may not turn to a sup-
posed body of federal common law to impose stricter stan-
dards than the statute provides."
It would thus appear that in Jones Falls permitting the public nuisance
action would be tantamount to an overruling of Congress.
B. Dissenting View
The dissent in Jones Falls disagreed with the majority's in-
terpretation of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee and argued that the federal
common law nuisance doctrine is not limited to actions brought by
governmental entities.'°° The dissent read City of Milwaukee as not ex-
" See 539 F.2d at 1007.
"Id. at 1009 (footnote omitted).
100 1d. at 1012-19 (dissenting opinion).
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pressly limiting federal common law nuisance suits to actions brought
by states.'" Under the dissent's reading, the City of Milwaukee nuisance
doctrine was generally fashioned from policies derived from federal
law and compatible state law concerning water pollution control.'"
The dissent understood the purpose of its creation to be to fill in
statutory interstices in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments and to provide uniform rules for water pollution
abatement. 1 ".The dissent further noted that the citizen suit provisions
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments'" exhibit a
federal policy to permit suits by private parties to abate water pollu-
tion under federal common law. 1 6 9 The dissent derived this policy
from the grant of a right to sue, coupled with the express preserva-
tion of all other statutory and common law rights outside the Act
which private individuals might have.' 06 Finally, having found
"neither a substantive nor a jurisdictional barrier to a citizen's reliance
on federal common law,"'" the dissent suggested that the only possi-
ble barrier to plaintiffs' maintenance of the suit would be a lack of
standing.'"
An analysis of the dissent's approach suggests that the dissent fo-
cuses on the basic federal common law principles set forth in Illinois v.
City of Milwaukee, without considering whether the creation of federal
common law in Jones Falls would serve those same purposes. Thus the
dissent's statement that City of Milwaukee is not expressly limited to
states is, of course, correct; but the Supreme Court's use of authority
in that case, together with its facts, strongly suggests that the position
of the state as an aggrieved sovereign was a determinative factor in
the Court's decision to formulate a remedy under federal common
law.' ° 9
Similarly, while the dissent is correct in its statement that in City
of _Milwaukee the Court expressly found a policy that federal law
should be controlling in the area of water pollution control, the Court
also found that federal law expressed a policy to encourage state pol-
lution control."° Hence in City of Milwaukee the creation of federal
common law was in accord with these two federal policies. Neither of
these policies would be served, however, by the application of federal
'°' Id. at 1013 (dissenting opinion).
102 Id. (dissenting opinion).
7 3 1d. (dissenting opinion).
"4 33 U.S.C.	 1365 (Stipp. V 1975). See note 7 supra for text of that section.
105 539 F.2d at 1012-13 (dissenting opinion).
"5 Id, 33 U.S.C. 1365(a) (Supp. V 1975) grants citizens the right to sue under
the Act. See note 7 supra for text of that section. The savings clause, 33 U.S.C. §
1365(e) (Supp. V 1975), provides: "Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which
any person (or class of persons) may have under any statute or common law to seek en-
forcement of any effluent standard or limitation or to seek any other relief (including
relief against the Administrator or a State agency)."
1°' 539 F.2d at 1014 (dissenting opinion).
105 /d. at 1014-16 (dissenting opinion).
155 See text at notes 81-84 supra.
" 5 406 U.S. at 102, 104.
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common law in the Jones Falls case. Creating federal common law
would not serve to set federal law above state law, but would instead
replace federal statutory law with federal common law. Furthermore,
the creation of federal common law in ./ones Falls clearly could not be
based on the second federal goal of encouraging state pollution con-
trol activity.
Accordingly, the extension of federal common law nuisance to
suits by private parties in the Jones Falls case may not be based on a
consideration of federal environmental policy. Nor, despite the dis-
sent's argument to the contrary, may a formulation of federal com-
mon law be grounded on a need for interstitial lawmaking or on a
jurisdictional mandate derived from the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments. In Illinois v. City of Milwaukee the creation of
federal common law fulfilled the classic function of filling in statutory
interstices by creating a right of action for Illinois where the statutory
mechanism for resolving a water pollution dispute was inadequate."'
I njones Falls, however, the dispute does not involve an interstitial area
in the statute which requires judicial lawmaking. The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments provide for the permit program
under which the defendants' polluting activity is occurring, and
further provide for immunity from suit for those operating under the
permit program." 2 Because the statute has set forth this permit pro-
gram and immunity, the application of federal common law in Jones
Falls, by opposing the statute, would not lead to greater uniformity in
the law, but would instead make the federal Iaw on water pollution
control less uniform.
A consideration of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments similarly fails to reveal a policy which would permit pri-
vate parties to sue under federal common law to abate water pollu-
tion. The jurisdictional grant in section 1365(a) of the Act provides
that jurisdiction shall be in the federal courts, regardless of diversity
of citizenship or the amount in controversy.'" This jurisdiction, how-
ever, is expressly limited to suits for violations of the statute or ad-
ministrative orders and for the Administrator's failure to perform
non-discretionary acts or duties." 4 The jurisdictional grant thus serves
two purposes: 1) it makes clear that private citizens have a right of ac-
tion for statutory violations, thereby eliminating the necessity of imply-
ing such a right; and 2) it eliminates the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement which private individuals would have to meet in certain in-
stances were they to sue under the district court's federal question
jurisdiction. 15 The jurisdictional grant, however, does not create a
general right to sue in federal court for the pollution of navigable
"i Id. at 102-03.
"I
 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. V 1975). See note 1 1 supra for text of that section.
"3 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (Supp. V 1975). See note 7 supra for text of that section,
114 Id.
113 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331(a) (Dec. 1976 Pamph. 4, Part 2). See note 49 supra for
text of that section.
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waters. Hence nothing in the limited jurisdictional grant of section
1365 makes possible an inference of an express policy to create fed-
eral common law to govern questions of water pollution. Nor does the
existence of a savings clause in the statutory grant of jurisdiction suf-
fice as a basis for federal judicial lawmaking. The dissent in Jones Falls
argues that the savings clause of the Act, section 1365(0, 1 " refers to
actions at federal common law as well as at state law.'" This fact is in-
sufficient in and of itself, however, as a ground for suit under federal
common law. Section 1365(e) does not create a right of action, but
rather simply reserves any previously existing right of action. It still
remains for the court to determine whether in fact the plaintiffs have
a common law right which they may pursue.
The dissent's arguments in favor of creating federal common law
in the tones Falls case thus fail to consider the policy distinctions which
require differing results in suits brought by governmental entities and
private parties. An analysis of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee and more re-
cent cases leads to the conclusion that federal judicial lawmaking in
the nuisance area has taken place in response to the legitimate interests
of governmental entities in the waters within their sovereign control.
Furthermore, the policy expressed in the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments cannot encourage federal common lawmak-
ing which denigrates the role of the state in water pollution control.
The majority's restriction of the federal common law nuisance doctrine to
governmental entities in Jones Falls accordingly rests on an understanding
of the policy and function of the federal common law of nuisance.
III. PERMISSIBILITY OF FEDERAL COMMON LAW NUISANCE SUIT TO
ABATE POLLUTION OF INTRASTATE WATERS
The question whether the federal common law nuisance doctrine
is limited to interstate bodies of water has been raised in few federal
courts since Illinois v. City of Milwaukee. 11 " As previously noted, these
lower federal courts for the most part have limited the doctrine to in-
terstate waters. Following the trend set by the courts examining the
question to date, a majority of the Fourth Circuit in Jones Falls found
that the federal common law of nuisance could not be applied to
abate pollution in an intrastate body of water.'" Relying on its in-
terpretation of City of Milwaukee and on the recent decision of the
Eighth Circuit in Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,'" the majority held that
" 6 33 U.S.C. 4 1365(e) (Supp. V 1975). See note 106 supra for text of that clause.
17 539 F.2d at 1013 (dissenting opinion).
" 8 Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 520 (8th Cir. 1975), modified on
other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir. 1976). See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. United
States, 408 F. Supp. 556, 562 (E.D. Va. 1976).
16 539 F.2d at 1008-10.
' 2° 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified on other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir.
1976).
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the intrastate nature of the Jones Falls case made it inappropriate for
the application of federal common law, since the controversy was en-
tirely local and there was no out-of-state effect alleged.' 21
 The court
argued that because of the nature of the dispute, state law was
adequate to resolve the controversy.' 22
 Finally the majority found that
the federal interest in the waters of Jones Falls extended only as far as
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments, upon which
plaintiffs had failed to make a claim. 123
 The dissent, on the other
hand, contended that the federal common law of nuisance could be
applied in controversies involving intrastate waters.'" The dissent
thus interpreted Illinois v. City of Milwaukee broadly to include naviga-
ble as well as interstate waters.' 25
 The dissent further argued that the
expansion in the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act to cover tributaries to navigable waters should similarly
expand the scope of the federal common law.' 2° Finally, the dissent-
ing judges found that the broad definition of navigable waters used in
the Act, the regulations thereto, and recent case law would include
Jones Falls Stream as a navigable water.'"
An analysis of precedent on the question of permissibility of nui-
sance suits involving intrastate navigable waters does not satisfactorily
resolve the dispute between the majority and the dissenting judges in
Jones Falls. The language of Illinois v. City of Milwaukee leaves the ques-
tion of navigable versus interstate waters unresolved. Throughout its
opinion the Supreme Court uses the two terms interchangeably.'"
Moreover, a review of the few recent cases interpreting Illinois v. City
of Milwaukee provides little guidance as to the proper interpretation of
the case. In the only other circuit to decide specifically the question of
interstate versus navigable waters, Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 129 the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit interpreted City of Milwaukee
as limited to interstate waters.'" However, the court disposed of the
federal common law claim summarily, neither explaining its in-




 Id. at 1011-14 (dissenting opinion).
225 Id. at 1010, 1013 (dissenting opinion).
""Id. at 1013 (dissenting opinion).
117
 Id. at 1010, 1011 (dissenting opinion).
"'See, e.g., 406 U.S. at 99.
129 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975), modified on other grounds, 529 F.2d 181 (8th Cir.
1976).
10
 Id. at 520. The court refused to find the federal common law of nuisance
applicable in a suit by the United States, the states of Minnesota, Michigan, and Wiscon-
sin, and several environmental groups against the Reserve Mining Company to halt the
discharge of taconite tailings into Lake Superior. Id. at 499-500, 520. The Court as-
serted, "As formulated in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee ... and Texas v. Pankey,
federal nuisance law contemplates, at a minimum, interstate pollution of air or water."
Id. at 520 (citations omitted). Accord, Board of Supervisors v. United States, 408 F.
Supp. 556, 559, 562 (E.D. Va. 1976) (complaint alleging federal common law nuisance
ordered amended to allege the interstate character of the pollution).
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terpretation of City of Milwaukee, nor considering what policy reasons
should restrict the federal common law nuisance remedy to the
abatement of pollution in interstate waters.' 31 Although no court has
specifically held that City of Milwaukee should be interpreted to include
navigable waters, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while
not deciding the question, has observed that the language in the City
of Milwaukee decision may extend to all navigable waters. 132 The lim-
ited analysis presented by these cases accordingly can help little in de-
termining whether a broad or narrow interpretation of City of Mil-
waukee should govern the creation of federal common law in nuisance
suits to halt pollution of intrastate waters. Resolution of the question
therefore requires a consideration of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments and the interpretation which the courts
have given to their navigability requirement.
In light of the broad scope of the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Amendments, the broad statutory definitions of navigable waters,
and the liberal construction of navigable waters by the federal courts
in recent cases, the view espoused by the dissent in Jones Falls, and
apparently shared by the Seventh Circuit, that the federal common law
nuisance doctrine may apply to intrastate navigable waters seems to be
more in accord with federal policy. The history of the federal legisla-
tion on water pollution control indicates the expanded role which the
federal government has taken over the years with respect to pollution
control in navigable waters. Since the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act was first enacted, its jurisdiction has been expanded from in-
terstate to navigable waters. The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation
Act of 1 899, 133 the first federal legislation in the field, was itself a
strong congressional declaration of interest in the preservation of the
nation's navigable waters. Section 13 of the Act, commonly known as
the Refuse Act, prohibited the discharge of refuse, except for sewage,
into any navigable water or into any tributary thereof from which the
refuse might flow into the navigable waters.'" The Rivers and Har-
bors Appropriation Act changed the previously existing rule of WU-
"i 514 F.2d at 524. It should be noted, however, that the court's rejection of the
plaintiffs' federal common law claim did not affect the outcome of the case, since the
court found that the discharge violated Minnesota law and could therefore be enjoined
as a public nuisance. Id.
132 Stream Pollution Control Bd. v. United States Steel Corp., 512 F.2d 1036,
1040 (7th Cir, 1975). The court there held that the ,federal district court had jurisdic-
tion to hear a claim seeking abatement under federal common law of the pollution of
the Grand Calumet River, a navigable waterway and a tributary of Lake Michigan, an
interstate body of water. The court specifically noted the references in City of Milwaukee
to interstate or navigable waters and observed: "Those references may well imply that
the federal common law of public nuisance extends to all of our navigable waters, and
perhaps to all tributaries of interstate waters." Id. at 1040.
"2 Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (current version codified at 33 U.S.C. § 401
(1970) ).
134 Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch, 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152
(1899) (current version codified at 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970) ).
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lamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hateh, 135 in which the Supreme Court had
held that there was no federal common law which prohibited nui-
sances or interferences in navigable waters entirely within a state.' 36
The Court expressly declared that to bring the question within federal
jurisdiction would require a direct act of Congress.' 37 The Rivers and
Harbors Appropriation Act, first enacted three years following Wil-
lamette, may thus be seen as the first indicator of congressional con-
cern over navigable waters.
The history of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act also dem-
onstrates .a continual -expansion of federal jurisdiction over the na-
tion's waters. In 1948 Congress enacted the Water Pollution Control
Act. 138
 The 1948 Act spoke entirely in terms of interstate waters. Sec-
tion 2(a) of the Act provided, "The Surgeon General shall ... prepare
or adopt comprehensive programs for eliminating or reducing the
pollution of interstate waters and tributaries thereof...."" 9 In 1961
the Act was then amended to extend jurisdiction over navigable as
well as interstate waters. Section 8(a) of the Act, as amended, pro-
vided, "The pollution of interstate or navigable waters in or adjacent
to any State or States . which endangers the health or welfare of
any persons, shall be subject to abatement ...." 140
The changing declaration of policy in the Act similarly shows the
changed congressional intent to protect navigable, as well as interstate
waters, from pollution. In the original 1948 Act, the declared policy
was to "recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities
and rights of the States in controlling water pollution." 14 ' in 1965 the
Act was amended to state a policy in which the federal government
took a more active role. "The purpose of this Act is to enhance the
quality and value of our water resources and to establish a national
policy for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollu-
tion."142
The most recent amendment to the Act dramatically shows the
change in the scope of federal involvement in the nation's waters since
the passage of the act in 1948. The 1972 Amendments to the Act ex-
pressly declare its goals in terms of navigable waters.
The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's
waters. In order to achieve this objective it is hereby de-
clared that, consistent with the provisions of this Act-
'3s
	 U.S. 1 (1888).
1" Id. at 8.
'3r Id.
"" Ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
' 39 Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, § 2(a), 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
tu Federal Water Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. 87-88, § 7, 75 Stat. 204, 207-08
(1961)
"I Water Pollution Control Act, ch. 758, § 1, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948).
142 Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-234, § I, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
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(1) it is the national goal that the discharge of pollu-
tants into the navigable waters be eliminated by 1985 ...." 3
Accordingly, a review of the federal legislation enacted during the
past three decades makes evident an increased federal commitment to
participating in pollution control of navigable as well as of interstate
waters.
This conclusion is buttressed by an analysis of the actual lan-
guage of the most recent amendments. The use of the phrase naviga-
ble waters is in no way restricted in the Federal Water Pollution Con-
trol Act Amendments of 1972. This is in decided contrast to earlier
versions of the Act. Thus, the use of the phrase "interstate or naviga-
ble waters" by the Supreme Court in its pronouncement of the federal
common law nuisance doctrine in Illinois v. City of Milwaukee may be
viewed not as an ambiguous, unclear statement by the Court as to the
scope of the doctrine, but rather as a phrase directly taken from the
language of the Act which would most directly express the policy of
the Act as it was at that time. However, as the policy of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act has changed to include the protection of
navigable waters, so should the federal common law of nuisance
change, especially since it is created in light of the congressionally ex-
pressed policy in the area. 144
Both the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments and
the regulations promulgated thereunder by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency have broadly defined "navigable waters." Section 1362(7)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments defines
navigable waters as " the waters of the United States, including the
territorial seas." 45 An examination of the legislative history further
reveals that Congress intended a broad construction to be given to
"navigable waters." 46 The federal regulations defining "navigable
waters" promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency are ad-
ditional evidence of the breadth with which that term has been de-
fined. 147 The regulations specifically include tributaries of navigable
t" Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-500,
2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972).
' 44 539 F.2d at 1013 (dissenting opinion).
14 ' 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (Supp. V 1975).
146 S. Coup. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 144, reprinted in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & Au. NEWS 3776, 3821.22.
" 7 40 C.F.R. § I25.1(p) (1976) provides:
(p) The term "navigable waters" includes:
(1) All navigable waters of the United States;
(2) Tributaries of navigable waters of the United States;
(3) Interstate waters;
(4) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized by in-
terstate travelers for recreational or other purposes;
(5) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams from which fish or shellfish
are taken and sold in interstate commerce; and
(6) Intrastate lakes, rivers, and streams which are utilized For indus-
trial purposes by industries in interstate commerce.
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waters as navigable waters.' 4 B
Recent case law further indicates that the "navigable waters" test
has been so broadened as to place little, if any, limitation on federal
control over water pollution.'" Since the scope of the federal statute
has been held to include navigable waters, federal common law based
on a federal policy derived from the statute should be subject to the
same broad parameters.
In light of this recent expansion of federal interest in navigable
waters, the mere fact that a common law nuisance suit alleges pollu-
tion of an intrastate stream should not deprive the federal courts of
jurisdiction over the controversy. This is so because the federal in-
terest in the purity of the nation's waters extends to all navigable wa-
ters. Since the federal common law is derived from the federal policy in
the pollution control area, it is appropriate to construe expansively the
scope of the nusiance doctrine in light of legislative policy and judicial
interpretation of the statutes from which that policy is derived.
CONCLUSION
The majority opinion in Jones Falls, by restricting the federal
common law nuisance doctrine to suits involving governmental en-
tities, upholds the position of the state's role in environmental control
as against the federal government. Such a result here affirms the pol-
icy of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments to sup-
port state participation in the environmental area. The majority view,
however, that the scope of a federal common law nuisance suit is lim-
ited to interstate waters, while not affecting the outcome of the Jones
Falls case, appears to be an improper restriction in light of the federal
government's interest in navigable waters.
The decision in Jones Falls is a fair one in that it does not force a
state into the untenable position of following the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments with the understanding that it has ful-
filled its responsibility under the statute, only to discover itself open to
suit by private parties in the federal courts. The decision, however,
does strike a blow against environmental enforcement. The plaintiffs
in this case have only the alternative to sue for relief in state court.
Such a suit will be difficult to maintain in light of the available state
defense that it was following federal law. Indeed, it would be difficult
for a state court to declare an activity expressly permitted by federal
law to constitute a public nuisance under state law.
It is submitted, however, that environmental enforcement should
not be achieved by a judicial process that leaves the states uncertain as
to their responsibilities. Such a result cannot lead to consistency or uni-
18 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(p)(2) (1976).
"9 E.g., California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d
963, 964 n.1 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 200 (1976); United States v.
Ashland Oil and Transportation Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1323-25 (6th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 671-73 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
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fortuity in the federal law. More stringent environmental standards -
should be mandated, as in the past, by Congress, thereby providing
clear notice to the states of their roles and responsibilities in cleaning
up the environment.
CAROL GLAUBMAN KROCH
Estate Tax — Charitable Deduction: Cemetery not a Charitable Or-
ganization — Child v. United States t---Elizabeth M. Haas died in
January, 1969 leaving a sizeable estate which was disposed of by Will.
Among the will's provisions were bequests to two non-profit cemetery
associations — the Watertown Cemetery Association and the Grove
Cemetery Association 2 — which offered burial services to any person
able to pay the standard fees. The executor of the estate claimed that
both bequests were deductible tinder section 2055(a)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code (Code) 4 for purposes of assessing the federal estate
tax. 5 This section permits deduction of bequests to organizations
which "are organized and operated exclusively for . charitable pur-
poses."" The Internal Revenue Service, however, did not allow either
bequest as a deduction. The executor paid the assessed tax under pro-
540 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied 97 S. Ct. 1 104 (1977).
' One bequest of $25,000 was made to the Grove Cemetery Association, and
another bequest, of half of the residual estate was made to the Watertown Cemetery
Association, The latter bequest was valued at approximately 2.5 million dollars. Both
cemetery associations are non-profit organizations, governed by the N.Y. NoT-Fott-
PRoi:rr Com.. LAw, § 1401 (McKinney 1970), as amended (McKinney Supp. 1976-77).
Since the Grove Cemetery Association did not join in the appeal, the Second Circuit
limited its discussion to the issues raised by the Watertown Cemetery Association. 540
F.2d at 582-84. This note refers primarily to the Watertown Cemetery Association, but
the principles discussed are applicable to both Associations.
Ruth Child was co-executor of the Haas estate and was co-plaintiff, along with
the National Bank of Northern New York. Mrs. Child died during the pendency of the
suit, leaving the bank as sole executor. The Watertown Cemetery Association also joined
as co-plaintiff in the suit. 540 F.2d at 580-81 & n.l. An unsuccessful petition for cer-
tiorari was filed with the Supreme Court, under the name National Bank of Northern
New York v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 1104 (1977).
1.R.C. § 2055(a)(2) provides, in its relevant parts, for deductions from the value
of the gross estate for bequests:
to or for the use of any corporation organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes ... no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private stock-
holder or individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is carry-
ing on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation, and
which does not participate in, or intervene in any political campaign on
behalf of any candidate for public office ....
540 F.2d at 581,
" I.R.G. § 2055(a)(2). The executor also claimed that the cemetery associations
qualified as religious organizations. 540 F.2d at 581, The claim was based on the fact
that religious services were conducted in the burial process, and that burial itself is a re-
ligious activity. rrhe district court dismissed this claim, and the court of appeals af-
firmed. Id. at 584. A claim that conducting religious services in a cemetery makes the
cemetery corporation one organized for religious purposes has no support in authority,
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